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THE EFFECT OF INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS
ON THE COMPARABILITY OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING NUMBERS
Governmental standard setters have expressed concern with consistency of
accounting standards and the related effect on comparability of information in
accounting reports. This study attempts to determine whether the choice to use
or not to use internal service funds (ISFs) affects the accounting ratios of
municipalities. A t-test comparison of several measures of the variability of
municipal expenditure ratios between cities that do and do not use ISFs
suggests that inconsistency in practice results in measurable differences
between the two groups. Ordinary least squares analysis controlling for other
variables confirmed these results. Additional analysis further investigates,
in departments where expected service level patterns can be specified, whether
use or nonuse of ISFs to account for the fixed assets is more likely to report
expenditure patterns consistent with the service patterns. For fire and police
departments, the use of ISFs for equipment management resulted in expenditure
patterns more closely approximating the expected service patterns and, in that
sense, more comparable over time.

THE EFFECT OF INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS
ON THE COMPARABILITY OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING NUMBERS
1. INTRODUCTION
Fund accounting and the modified accrual basis of accounting are two of
the primary attributes that distinguish governmental from business accounting.
The two attributes are interrelated since, of the eight fund types permitted
for state and local government accounting, the modified accrual basis is
required for five. The full accrual method is required for two, and both
methods are permitted for the eighth, depending on the purpose of the fund.
Recent research has demonstrated an association between the variability of
accounting ratios and the use of fund accounting by cities: cities that use all
eight fund types exhibit lower variability, on average, in certain ratios over
time than do cities that do not use all of the eight fund types (Ingram and
Copeland, 1986). Other research has found that cities using all eight fund
types exhibit lower credit risk, on average, than cities that do not use the
eight fund types (Ingram, 1986). Explanations for these observed differences
have been tenuous.
This study provides one explanation of the findings of the earlier
research. The explanation hinges on the type of accounting used by the funds,
rather than on the number of funds. Funds that must use the modified accrual
basis of accounting are used by all cities; the general fund, for example, is
used to account for most general government activities. 1 There is more
flexibility in the choice to employ funds that use full accrual accounting.
Certain activities that are common to nearly all cities are accounted for by
some cities in funds that use full accrual accounting (e.g., internal service
funds) but are accounted for by other cities in funds (usually the general
fund) that use modified accrual accounting. Our study confirms that
differences in variability of municipal expenditure ratios and of departmental
expenditures are related to the choice to account for certain activities in
internal service funds, using full accrual accounting, or to account for them
in the general fund, using modified accrual accounting.
The findings of this study, along with those of the earlier research, are
important in demonstrating that certain governmental accounting principles can
affect the intertemporal comparability of accounting numbers within and across
governments. Such comparability is important to government financial report
users (Jones, et al., 1985) and to the GASB (1986, par. 45):
Financial reports should be comparable. This is not to imply
that similarly designated governments perform the same functions.
Comparability implies that differences between financial reports
should be due to substantive differences in the underlying
transactions or the governmental structure rather than due to the
selection of different alternatives in accounting procedures and
practices. Financial reporting should enable users to make
comparisons of costs of specific functions, such as police protection
or garbage collection.
Current governmental accounting principles provide latitude in the
selection of fund types and in the activities accounted for in each fund. Our
research demonstrates that the resulting variations in accounting practice are
at odds with the comparability objective of the GASB. Cost comparisons for
certain functions (both across governments and across time within the same
government) are made difficult by current governmental accounting practice.
Our discussion focuses on different methods of accounting for fixed
assets. Some governments account for certain fixed asset purchases in
governmental funds. These purchases are recorded as expenditures of the fund
at the time of the purchase. Other governments account for some of these same
3purchases in internal service funds (ISFs). These purchases are recorded as
assets of the ISF set up to manage the assets and are subsequently
depreciated. 2 The user departments in the governmental funds record
expenditures when they are billed by the ISF for use of those assets. The next
section describes the accounting for these purchases and the effect of using
ISFs in more detail.
2. THE ISF MODEL
Governmental Accounting, Auditing, and Financial Reporting (GAAFR, 1980)
explains that ISFs can be used to account for goods and services that are
provided by one department to other governmental departments on a cost-
reimbursement basis. ISFs commonly handle purchasing activities, inventory
management, data processing services, duplication and printing, motor pools,
vehicle and equipment repairs, and motorized equipment service and rental. The
alternative to handling these activities in departments set up as ISFs is to
have each user department directly account for its own purchase of goods and
services, using generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) appropriate for
each department. GAAP for ISFs and for most governmental departments are not
the same, and, as a result, the choice to use ISFs, or not, will have different
effects on the financial statements.
In most cities, accounting for fixed assets is handled within the general
fund department using the assets. The total cost of a fixed asset is recorded
as an expenditure in the general fund when purchased, and it is simultaneously
noted in the general fixed asset group of accounts. No attempt is made to
allocate the cost of these general fixed assets to the fiscal periods in which
they are consumed. GAAFR refers to this as modified accrual accounting, but
hereafter we will call it "expenditure accounting" for simplicity.
Purchases of assets controlled by an ISF are recorded in that fund on a
full accrual basis (hereafter, "expense accounting"), as required by GAAP for
ISFs. Expenses are recorded when the assets are consumed, with depreciation
expense being recorded for the use of fixed assets. Sales, rental, and service
revenues are recorded in the ISF based on charges to other departments for the
goods or services they receive, resulting in net income or loss for the ISF.
User departments record expenditures when the liability is incurred, based upon
the billings from the ISF, resulting in a stream of expenditures over the
useful life of the asset. Thus, the result of managing assets and services
through an ISF is to embody some elements of commercial accounting in the
traditional governmental accounting model for the departments consuming ISF
assets and services.
The following simplified example illustrates the difference in financial
statement numbers likely to result from accounting for fixed assets in the two
types of funds. Let A and B represent two cities that are identical in all
respects except that A accounts for the purchase of fire engines in the general
fund and B uses an ISF to purchase the equipment. B's ISF then rents fire
engines to the fire department accounted for in the general fund. At the
beginning of year 1, both cities purchase trucks for $200,000. The trucks are
expected to be used for 20 years at an approximately equal rate per year. The
ISF in City B rents the truck to the fire department for $10,000, or l/20th of
the purchase price, per year. Fire department costs, other than equipment
costs, are $100,000 per year for each city. The reported general fund
expenditures for the fire department for the first four years of service are
compared below:
Year City A City B
1 $300,000 $110,000
2 100,000 110,000
3 100,000 110,000
4 100,000 110,000
Each time City A makes a major fixed asset purchase, a "jump" in general fund
expenditures will occur similar to the one illustrated in year 1. Similar
purchases by City B will result in a smoothed expenditure stream in the general
fund because of the accrual accounting process of the ISF.
These patterns carry over to the general government expenditure and total
expenditure numbers of the cities, as well. Both these figures will be
$190,000 higher for City A in year 1 than for City B and will be $10,000 lower
in each of the following nineteen years as a result of the difference in
accounting practices. The activity of the ISF itself is not combined with
governmental fund activity in the financial statements. Instead, it is
reported (using accrual accounting) as part of the proprietary fund activities
of the city.
Thus, while individuals who are reasonably knowledgeable of fund
accounting may be able to adjust, at least partially, the accounting numbers of
the two cities to make them comparable, it may be difficult for anyone looking
at the financial statements to adjust the aggregate expenditure numbers to make
them comparable without complete information about the underlying transactions.
2.1 EFFECTS OF ISFS ON VARIABILITY
One effect of expense accounting should be to reduce the variability of
certain expenditures over time relative to expenditure accounting. For
example, depreciation of fixed assets smooths the expense stream for these
assets relative to the practice of reporting the total expenditure in the
acquisition period. Inventoriable asset costs are also affected by these
practices. When ISFs charge user fees on a cost-reimbursement basis, smoothed
expense patterns in the ISFs should result in smoother expenditure patterns in
the user departments.
The variability of capital asset costs affects the variability of a
variety of accounting numbers and ratios that might be used for internal and
external decision-making. The amount reported for expenditures in a fiscal
period for various departments, programs, functions, and for the general
government as a whole may be separated into two parts. One we shall refer to
as operating expenditures, composed of payroll, nonfixed, and noninventoriable
costs. The other we shall refer to as capital expenditures, composed of
charges for fixed and inventoriable assets. The variability of the expenditure
ratio can thus be decomposed into the variability of each component as follows:
s2 = Xo 2 So 2 + Xc 2 Sc 2 + 2xo Xc Covo c ( 1
)
where s2 is the variance of total expenditures, x is the weight associated with
each component, Cov is the covariance, o represents operating expenditures, and
c represents capital expenditures. The variability of an expenditure ratio
depends on the variability of the component expenditures in relation to the
squares of the weights of the components.
On average, about 20 percent of total general government expenditures are
in the capital category, although the percent varies considerably across
departments. The covariance between operating and capital expenditures across
governments and across time is very small and has little effect on the total
variability measure (based on observations from the data set described later in
7this paper). The weights associated with capital expenditures for various
government departments and functions and the covariance measure will vary.
Expenditure ratios for various departments, functions, and for the general
government should differ across governmental units if (1) one governmental unit
uses internal service funds and another does not, and (2) internal service fund
services are an important component of the cost of a specific department or
function.
2.2 EFFECTS OF ISFS ON COMPARABILITY
Although users, standardsetters, and theoreticians seem to agree that
comparability is an important quality of financial information, this term has
been defined only in a general sense (see FASB, 1980). Miller (1978) suggests
that there are two general approaches to the definition of comparability. The
first concentrates on the input rules used in the accounting process and takes
the perspective that, if all entities consistently apply the same accounting
principles to the same type of event, financial information will be comparable.
This view is supported by Donald J. Kirk, chairman of the FASB, who stated
"Comparability is high on [the FASB'sJ list of qualities that are needed for
useful financial reporting and that will require a single method of accounting
for similar situations" (in Haskins and Sells, p. 1). This approach appears to
be reflected in the desires for consistency expressed by users of government
reports (Jones, et al., 1985). Input comparability suggests that all entities
should use the same accounting procedures, but it does not suggest which
alternative procedure is best.
Output comparability emphasizes the need for disclosures to represent
underlying economic events. This concept suggests that it should be possible
to describe desirable characteristics of reported numbers independent of the
8accounting process, thereby making it possible to determine which accounting
alternative produces numbers that are consistent with the characteristic.
Therefore, in order to test the degree to which a particular accounting
procedure leads to greater or less comparability in terms of outputs
(accounting numbers), it is necessary to establish criteria that the accounting
numbers should satisfy. Because of the operating differences among
governments, it is difficult to specify in advance what characteristics their
accounting information should display relative to one another. Because of this
difficulty, we have elected to concentrate on one aspect of comparability
within governments over time. Within a single government, it may be possible
to identify some situations in which certain desirable information
characteristics can be specified a priori . Within a city, for example, there
are some departments whose expected service patterns should remain relatively
stable over time. For these departments, the accounting procedure that produces
a more stable expenditure pattern could be said to exhibit a greater degree of
comparability, relative to service level, over time.
Within a city, there are usually departments that would be expected to
deliver a reasonably constant level of service, or output, to the public from
year to year. Examples of these departments would include the police and fire
departments. Regardless of budget constraints, most cities must continue to
provide fire and police protection to their constituents. Thus, the need, more
than other constraints, determines the level of service, and the stable
service level would be expected to produce costs that would be reasonably
smooth over time. 3 We will examine these departments specifically in some of
the tests that follow.
In the discussion of both input comparability and output comparability, we
are concerned with the variability produced in reported expenditure patterns
and whether the choice between use and nonuse of ISFs results in measurable
differences in those patterns. With regard to input comparability, we suggest
that the choice to use ISFs or not to use ISFs will lead to differences in the
patterns of the accounting ratios that are, for example, related to credit risk
and are used for intercity comparisons. If those differences are significant
enough to affect users' decisions, standard setters may wish to consider
limiting reporting alternatives to eliminate them. With regard to output
comparability, our analysis suggests that, in situations where evidence
supports stable service levels, use of ISFs results in patterns that are
smoother than the patterns produced by nonuse of ISFs. If the reduction in
variability is material, it would provide some evidence that, for those
departments, use of ISFs produces the more faithful representation of the
year-to-year cost of services provided.
In the section that follows, we present an empirical analysis of
expenditure ratio patterns of cities using ISFs with those of cities not using
ISFs to determine whether the expected differences in patterns emerge. Then, we
compare expenditure patterns for fire and police departments to determine
whether use of an ISF to manage the equipment for those departments appears to
increase comparability across time for those departments. The empirical
analysis confirms the model developed in the first part of the paper and
provides evidence on the magnitudes of the differences in reported expenditures
of cities using and those not using ISFs.
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3. EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS
3.1 INPUT COMPARABILITY
Our first analysis consisted of a comparison of accounting ratios from 498
municipalities for 1973-1982 that tested the hypothesis:
Hi : The intertemporal variability of accounting ratios is
greater for cities that do not use ISFs than for cities
that do use ISFs.
If this hypothesis holds true and the accounting ratios of cities using ISFs
exhibit different patterns than those not using ISFs, this provides some
justification for users' demands for consistency of application of accounting
principles across cities. Inconsistency with respect to the use of ISFs would
appear to contribute to noncomparability of accounting ratios. A difference in
the accounting ratios does not, however, provide a strong argument for choosing
one practice over the other without reference to the relevant underlying
economic attribute.
The hypothesis was tested using the ratio of general government
expenditures to general revenues for the cities tested. The variability of
total expenditures for the general fund should be affected if capital
expenditures associated with ISFs are an important component of total
expenditures. Revenues were used as a denominator in the ratio to control for
differences in size across governments and to control for differences in price
levels across time periods. Other research has shown that revenues provide a
useful control for these problems (see Ingram and Copeland, 1984). Other
methods of determining variability and controlling for size will be described
later.
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The sample used in the tests consisted of cities in the U.S. for which
financial statement data were available from the Bureau of the Census for 10
years and for which accounting practice data were available. The accounting
practice data were provided from a mail survey of city financial managers that
included information about internal service fund practices. The sample was
limited to cities with populations in excess of 25,000.
The measure of variability used to test the differences in patterns of
expenditure ratios between the two groups is the average squared deviation from
the mean:
10
ASD = Z (m - r) 2 / 10, (2)
n=l
where ASD is the average squared deviation, r is the expenditure ratio of
interest, and n is the year.
3.1.1 Results
The average squared deviation statistic for the ISF group (n=327) had a
mean of .068 and a standard deviation of .617. The mean for the no ISF group
(n=171) was .199 and the standard deviation was .739. The t score for
differences in the means was -1.995, significant at the .05 level.
The means (standard deviations) of the general expenditure/revenue ratios
(for the 10 year period 1973-1982) for the ISF and no ISF groups were .507
(.155) and .515 (.189), respectively. The t score for differences in the means
was -.476. Thus, the distributions of the ratios did not account for the
differences in variations in the ratios.
These results demonstrate that the expenditure ratios for cities that use
ISFs are less variable over time than are those of cities that do not use ISFs,
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consistent with our hypothesis. We extended the tests in order to confirm
these results.
3.1.2 Extended Tests
Two additional metrics were computed to measure the variability of the
accounting numbers. The average absolute deviation (AAD) was computed as:
10
AAD = I |rn - r| / 10. (3)
n=l
Also, the average absolute first difference (AFD) was computed as:
10
AFD = Z |m - m-i| / 9. (4)
n=2
For all three measures (ASD, AAD, and AFD) both the general expenditure to
revenue ratio and undeflated general expenditures were examined. In addition
to examining the effect of ISFs on these measures, we also examined the effects
of two other factors that we posited to be associated with the use of ISFs:
size and form of government. 4
The probability that a city will use ISFs to manage its assets increases
with the size of the city, since it is more efficient to establish a separate
management function for larger numbers of assets. For the sample used in this
study, the mean population for the ISF group was 180,000, compared to 112,000
for the no ISF group (significant at the .05 level).
Council-manager cities have been identified in several studies (e.g., see
Evans and Patton [1983]) as being more likely to adopt recommended accounting
practices than mayor-council cities because of incentives available to managers
to demonstrate professionalism. For our sample, 65 percent of council-manager
cities used ISFs compared to 40 percent of mayor-council cities (significant at
the .01 level).
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Our extended tests produced results consistent with those reported above.
Table 1 contains results for OLS regression models in which the three measures
of variability using undeflated expenditures were the dependent variables and
ISF (0 or 1 dummy variable), size as proxied by population, and council-manager
government (0 or 1 dummy variable) were included as independent variables. The
ISF variable is significant at the .01 level in each of the models, confirming
our earlier results.
The AAD and AFD coefficients can be translated into dollar effects in a
straightforward manner since the dependent variable is expressed in (millions
of) dollars. Accordingly, the use of ISFs reduced the average absolute
difference from the mean of general expenditures by $1,306,000 on average for
the 10 year period. The average reduction in annual differences in expenditure
(AFD) was $763,000. The average general expenditures for the period for the
sample was $32,327,000.
3.1.3 Limitations of the Analysis
The fact that groups of cities differ with respect to the variability of
accounting numbers does not indicate which alternative (if either) is to be
preferred. Selecting an accounting practice which reduces the variability of
accounting numbers is not preferable if the underlying economic events exhibit
high variability. Thus, if a user of the accounting numbers is interested in
predicting the cash flow demands of an entity that exhibits wide swings in cash
needs as a result of uneven demands for acquisition or replacement of major
fixed assets, the user may need to be informed of the underlying expenditure
pattern. On the other hand, if a user of the accounting numbers is interested
in comparing the cost of providing certain services across governments and
time, the user may be better served by information about the consumption,
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rather than the purchase, of resources by the entity. If expenditure
accounting adds artificial variability to the reported cost of services, it may
be difficult for legislative oversight boards and citizens to make comparisons
between fiscal years, across governments, or across departments, unless these
individuals have a fairly sophisticated understanding of the accounting
process.
Another limitation of the analysis is that no attempt has been made to
draw a linkage between management of specific departmental assets in ISFs and
the variability of the expenditure ratios. Without such a linkage, a
conclusion that the use of ISFs causes the difference in variability is
premature.
We address these limitations in the next section by examining the
variability of expenditures of departments that are known to use or not to use
assets managed by ISFs. The cost of these additional tests is a decrease in
sample size.
3.2 OUTPUT COMPARABILITY
Comparing cities that used ISFs to manage their fixed assets to those that
did not, we tested the hypothesis:
H2 : Fire and police departments operating in cities that manage
those departments' respective assets through ISFs will
demonstrate less variability in their reported expenditures
than the same departments in cities that do not use ISFs
for this purpose.
The patterns of reported total and capital expenditures of the fire and
police departments of cities using ISFs to manage their equipment were compared
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to expenditure patterns of the same departments in cities in which these assets
were purchased and reported by the user departments.
The financial statements made available by approximately 325 of the cities
surveyed were examined to identify those which appeared to have internal
service funds managing the fixed assets used by fire or police departments.
This was determined by reading descriptions of the ISFs in the financial
statements (when this was disclosed), by reading letters of submission from the
chief financial officers in which these funds were discussed, and by comparing
the amounts of assets reported by ISFs with those listed in the General Fixed
Assets Group of Accounts. Approximately 60 cities were identified that
appeared to use ISFs to manage police vehicles and fire equipment and charge
departments for asset use. (The ambiguity in many financial statements with
regard to the assets managed by ISFs suggested that even "sophisticated users"
might encounter problems in related analyses.)
From the survey of cities, a matching number were selected that were not
expected to use ISFs to manage these fixed assets. These were randomly
selected from the remaining cities. Because some ISFs managed one type of
asset, such as police cars, but did not manage, for example, fire engines, it
was not expected that the ISF and non-ISF groups would include the same cities
for comparing each type of department. After the initial groupings were made,
letters were sent to the finance directors of each city to specifically request
information regarding the types of assets managed by ISFs and the origination
dates of the funds. This information was used to finally classify cities as
ISF or no ISF for each type of department.
To compare the variability of reported expenditures between ISF and no ISF
departments, the expenditure patterns for the period 1973 through 1982 were
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analyzed for all responding departments with consistent ISF practice over the
10 year period. The expenditures for fire protection and police protection as
reported by the Bureau of the Census were used in this analysis.
3.2.1 Results
Table 2 reports results of the OLS regression models for police and fire
department expenditures, controlling for size and form of government. The ISF
variable is significant at the .05 level in each of the models. These results
confirm our hypothesis that the use of ISFs reduces the variability of
departmental expenditures. The variability related to the use of ISFs is on
the magnitude of $181,000 less (AAD), on average, for police departments and
$242,000 less, on average, for fire departments that use ISFs compared to those
that do not. The average departmental expenditures for cities in the sample
were $7,212,000 for fire departments and $5,604,000 for police departments.
These results support the results in the "Input Comparability" section.
Even though they are based on a smaller subset of cities, these results provide
stronger evidence concerning the effect of ISFs since we have determined that
specific departmental assets are managed in ISFs for one group of those cities.
Furthermore, we posit that the ISF practice provides a more faithful
representation of the cost of services patterns of police and fire departments.
We base this statement on the assumption discussed earlier that the service
levels of these departments remain relatively stable over time. In this
respect, use of ISFs appears to increase comparability of expenditures over
time.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
Governmental standard setters have expressed concern with consistency of
accounting standards and comparability of information in accounting reports.
We have attempted to determine whether the choice to use or not to use ISFs
affects the accounting ratios of municipalities, and we have found that
inconsistency in this practice appears to result in measurable differences
between the two groups. Given these results, users' concerns for consistency
of application of accounting principles appear to be justified.
We have also attempted to determine, in cases where expected service level
patterns can be specified, whether use or nonuse of ISFs is more likely to
report expenditures consistent with those patterns. For fire departments and
police departments, the use of ISFs for equipment management resulted in
expenditure patterns more closely approximating the expected service patterns
and, in that sense, more comparable over time. In view of these findings, the
GASB may wish to consider narrowing the choice of accounting methods with
respect to ISFs or prescribing circumstances in which they should or should not
be used. Our research indicates that, in order to facilitate informed
comparisons between cities, financial statements should, at least, inform users
which assets or activities are managed through ISFs and report classifications
of General Fixed Assets by function and activity.
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FOOTNOTES
X A11 cities do not use the modified accrual basis for these funds. Some
use the cash basis. All of the cities in this study used the modified accrual
basis for these funds.
2 Similar differences exist in some governments for assets acquired by
enterprise funds such as public utilities and transit services. These
activities are beyond the scope of the current study which considers only
activities that are common to nearly all cities.
3 Although we have found no national statistics on services provided by
these departments, we did survey the police and fire chiefs of cities we
selected for our study. These individuals were asked, "In the last 10 years,
have there been any major changes in state or other requirements that have
significantly added to or reduced the number of services your department
provides?" Their responses supported our assumption of stable service levels.
No major changes were reported by 51% of fire chiefs and 57% of police chiefs.
With regard to the positive responses, 29% of fire chiefs and 22% of police
chiefs reported one-time changes, such as takeover of emergency medical
service, in the ten-year period. Thus, in nearly 80% of both cases, smooth
patterns or smooth patterns with one "step" would be reasonable expectations.
There was no observed correlation between the one-time changes and the use of
ISFs.
4 Little formal theory is available to suggest why some cities use ISFs and
others do not. The two factors we examined were selected because the linkages
were intuitive and because empirical evidence supported the relationships with
ISFs.
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TABLE 1
OLS REGRESSION MODELS FOR GENERAL EXPENDITURES
20
Variable
ASD AAD AFD
Coefficient t score Coefficient t score Coefficient t score
Intercept
ISF
Size
Cover nmen t
-275.86
-295.34
12.16
106.77
[F=124.8;
-2.538
-2.126
18.679
9 .805
R =.436]
1.258
-1.306
.191
-.287
[F=1921.8;
3.996
-3.265
42.192
9 -.748
R =.941]
1.536
-.763
.087
-. 120
[F=617.9;
6.479
-2.534
25.508
9 -.416
R =.837]
TABLE 2
OLS REGRESSION MODELS FOR POLICE AND
FIRE EXPENDITURES
21
Variable
Police Department Expenditures
ASD AAD
Coefficient t score Coefficient t score
AFD
Coefficient t score
intercept
SF
lize
lovernmen t
-1.219 -2.184
-.457 -2.567
.029 4.579
.206
?
.220
[F=23.57; R =.540]
. 136 1.059
-.181 -2.265
.005 5.488
-.010 -.277
[F=38.08; R =.658]
.096 1.890
-.117 -1.933
.002 4.814
.009 .472
[F=27.13; R =.576]
Variable
Fire Department Expenditures
ASD AAD AFD
Coefficient t scon Coefficient t score Coefficient t score
n tercep t
SF
ize
overnment
-4.122 -2.125
-.875 -2.866
.104 6.403
-.361 -.374
[F=39.78; R =.668]
.058 1.419
-.242 -2.735
.011 7.359
-.060 ,-1 .215
[F=61.43; R =.758]
.037
-.146
.004
-.082
1 . 233
-1 .999
4.910
-. 726
[F=42.35; R =.682]



